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I   Introduction  
In recognition of the fact that governments are often the single largest buyer of goods 
and services in an economy the World Trade Organization (‘WTO’) implemented the 
Government Procurement Agreement (‘GPA’) to foster international competition in 
procurement among member governments in a transparent manner free from 
discrimination. Yet even within one nation, ‘government’ may consist of a myriad of 
smaller bodies, each with its own regulatory approach to procurement activities. The 
GPA made provision for the inclusion of sub-central entities because of the economic 
significance of such transactions but also because procurement at the regional level, 
as at the national level, can be implemented to achieve social or economic ends that 
often conflict with the principles of free trade. This article will examine an aspect of 
the WTO GPA that has attracted astonishingly little attention from critics: the 
anomalous failure of Canada to commit its ten sub-central governments to the 
agreement. Several reasons for Canada’s provincial abstinence from the GPA will be 
explored as will the procurement regulations that exist in its place at the provincial 
level. Potential benefits for regional accession to the GPA will be considered and the 
article will conclude with the recommendation that the provinces enter the regime or 
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risk international economic marginalization in the procurement field. A discussion of 
Canadian provincial procurement under Chapter 10 of NAFTA is beyond the scope of 
this article, which deals exclusively with the WTO framework.1 Municipal 
procurement (purchases by local governments such as cities or townships) will be 
similarly excluded from specific commentary2 as will reference to the revised GPA 
which was provisionally agreed upon in December 2006 but is still subject to ongoing 
negotiations3. We will begin by briefly outlining the GPA itself and the extent of 
Canada’s current coverage at the federal level. 
 
 
II    The WTO GPA and Canada’s Commitment 
Government procurement is largely excluded from the WTO’s multilateral 
agreements and is instead administered primarily under the plurilateral (optional) 
GPA, an agreement which was signed in Marrakech in April 1994 and went into 
effect January 1996.4 The previous government procurement agreement under the 
Tokyo Round General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (‘GATT’) negotiations was 
based on an Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (‘OECD’) 
draft document from the 1960s and it was intended that early versions of the GATT 
would address government procurement but negotiating states objected because it was 
felt that such activities infringed too closely upon sovereignty to allow regulation at a 
multilateral level. These concerns were particularly grievous given the increasing role 
                                                
1
 For procurement under NAFTA see eg A Reich International Public Procurement Law (Kluwer Law 
International, 1999) ch 9; C Muggenberg “The Government Procurement Chapter of NAFTA” 1 US-
Mexico L J 295 (1993) 
2
 Canada’s position remains that there will be no international commitments with respect to 
procurement at the municipal level.  Canada GPA Annex 2, 1 March 2000 
3
 For a discussion of the revised GPA see R Anderson, “Renewing the WTO Agreement on Public 
Procurement: Progress to Date and Ongoing Negotiations” PPLR 2007, 4, 255  
4
 For a detailed discussion of the history of this agreement and a comprehensive outline of its sections 
see S Arrowsmith, Government Procurement in the WTO (Kluwer Law International, 2000). 
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of the public sector in many national economies in the 1970s.5 At present the 
inclusion of government procurement under the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (‘GATS’) is currently being negotiated by the Multilateral Working Party as 
required Article XIII 2 of that agreement.  
The key provisions of the GPA are Article III which guarantees equal 
treatment between foreign and domestic suppliers of goods and services, and as 
among all foreign suppliers (other than normal custom duties) and Article II which 
establishes fairness in valuation of bids. Articles VII to XVII ensure that tendering 
and contract selection is conducted in a fair and transparent manner, through 
provisions covering time limits and delivery (Article XI), documentation (Article 
XII), and generally on transparency in tender conditions (Article XVII). Disputes 
under the agreement are subject to binding resolution under the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding. Through these measures the GPA aims to assist signatory 
nations to achieve the best value-for-money for their taxpayers and business 
opportunities for their firms by creating competitive conditions where contracts are 
awarded to the best tender submitted in a manner that is fair.  Additionally, it has been 
suggested that opening government procurement to international competition through 
the GPA will fight corruption by “[e]xpos[ing] the policies with which some 
governments have been covering their wasteful ways and impoverishing their peoples 
in the process.”6 While the actual effectiveness of the GPA in achieving market access 
has been questioned7 as has its utility to developing countries through the special 
                                                
5
 J Jackson, World Trading System 2nd Ed (MIT, 1997) at 225. 
6
 V Mosoti “The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement: A Necessary Evil in the Legal 
Strategy for Development in the Poor World” (2004) 25 U of Pennsylvania J of International Economic 
L 593 at 598 
7
 S Everett and B Hoekman “Government Procurement: Market Access, Transparency and Multilateral 
Trade Rules” Policy Research Working Paper – World Bank Development Research Group (Geneva 
2004).  These authors conclude that improved transparency will not necessarily improve market access 
because of a corresponding fall in demand, at 18. 
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treatment provisions of Article V8 the GATT Secretariat estimated that there would be 
a ten fold increase in trade in government procurement over coverage under the 
earlier code, but the extent to which this materializes may depend on the degree of 
privatization worldwide.9  
Accession to the GPA is available to all member states of the WTO and 
currently the GPA has 40 signatories including the 27 states of the enlarged European 
Union.10 Article XXIV.2 of the GPA requires that all parties to the agreement must 
agree upon the accession of a new party. When signing on to the agreement, a 
government must submit a list of entities (as well as services) to be covered – the 
extent of this coverage is established on a bilateral basis – parties often negotiate with 
each other based on their procurement offer and request specific derogations from 
national treatment concerning areas of particular interest.11 There is no general most 
favoured nation principle within the WTO agreements that allows members that are 
not signatories to the GPA to benefit from concessions made within it by GPA parties. 
Coverage under the GPA adopts the ‘positive list’ approach – parties specify the 
procurement (by entity and service) that is to be regulated and any procurement that is 
not explicitly mentioned is excluded. The issue of which government entities are 
covered by the GPA is far from straightforward because the status of bodies as 
independent government entities, commercial state-owned companies and joint 
venture (public/private) enterprises can be unclear, particularly in relation to transition 
                                                
8
 P Sutherland “The Doha Development Agenda:  Political Challenges to the World Trading System – 
A Cosmopolitan Perspective” in E Petersmann ed Reforming the World Trading System (Oxford 
University Press 2005) at 40.  Cf Mosoti above note 5. The only GPA members that have developing 
nation status are Israel and Korea. 
9
 A Lowenfeld, International Economic Law (Oxford University Press, 2003) at 86-87. 
10
 The signatories are: Canada, European Union (including its 27 member States: Austria, Belgium, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, Bulgaria and Romania), Hong Kong China, Iceland, Israel, Japan, 
Korea, Liechtenstein, Netherlands with respect to Aruba, Norway, Singapore, Switzerland, United 
States.  Nine additional WTO member states are in the process of acceding to the GPA. 
11
 Arrowsmith note 3 at 93. 
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economies.12 Jackson noted the difficulty involved with states arriving upon an agreed 
definition of government agency when grappling with the incorporation of 
government procurement into the GATT in part because ‘nations have a wide variety 
of ideas as to what is the appropriate sphere of government activity.’13 These 
problems are exacerbated by the fact that some countries economies are exclusively 
state controlled as well as the trend in some countries toward privatization. Unlike the 
earlier GATT procurement agreement, the WTO GPA expressly extended its 
coverage to sub-central/regional governments. The Tokyo Round agreement only 
required its parties to inform their regional and local governments of the objectives of 
the Code and ‘to draw their attention to the overall benefits of liberalization of 
government procurement.’14 As GPA negotiations have been conducted on a bilateral 
basis based on reciprocity, sub-federal purchasing by one state is open only to those 
states which list their own sub-federal purchases – an approach which has led to many 
reciprocity-based derogations being included in the Annexes.15 Under the GPA, each 
member’s Annex on Central Government Agencies (Annex 1) lists all of the central 
government bodies to which the GPA applies. Bodies covered here refer to federal 
level entities and includes individual federal ministries or departments as well as 
many bodies which are publicly controlled but which may be partially independent of 
conventional ministerial structure. Each member’s Annex 2 lists the regional 
governments (such as provinces or states) to which the agreement will apply.   
The Canadian federal government acceded to the WTO GPA and the WTO 
itself through the passage of the World Trade Organization Agreement 
                                                
12
 For a discussion of these matters see S Arrowsmith, J Linarelli and D Wallace, Regulating Public 
Procurement: National and International Perspectives ch. 6 (Kluwer International: London, 2000)  
13
 Jackson note 4 at 225. 
14
 Reich note 1 at 293 referring to Art I.2 of the Tokyo Agreement (1979) ILM 1052 
15
 Arrowsmith note 3 at 115.  See eg Japan’s denial of sub-central coverage to Canada: Japan GPA 
Annex 2, 1 March 2000. 
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Implementation Act16 which was brought into force on 1 January 1996. The inclusion 
of Canada into the regime of the GPA represents the opening of a significant market 
to international firms: the Canadian federal government spent CDN $8.6 billion on the 
procurement of goods and services in 2003-0417 making it one of the largest 
purchasing entities in the world. A detailed examination of Canada’s government 
procurement regime is beyond the scope of this article and, although there is very 
little recent academic attention to this topic, it has been discussed by others.18 Briefly, 
the federal government entities to which the GPA applies are set out in Annex 1 and 
cover a wide range of federal agencies from the Supreme Court to the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police, and unless there is a specific exclusion,19 the GPA applies. The GPA 
permits exceptions under Article XXIII for procurement activities that are necessary 
to protect public health, safety and national security. In Canada the Procurement 
Review Committee will assess potential socio-economic benefits of public purchases 
that are valued in excess of $2 million and will submit recommendations to the 
Treasury Board which may permit the award of a tender to a contractor that does not 
offer the lowest price.20 Among its policy-oriented purchasing is a preferential 
government contracting policy in favour of Canadian Aboriginal businesses which 
was implemented in 1996.21 Monetary thresholds are set every two years and 
Canada’s are currently at 130,000 Special Drawing Rights (‘SDR’).22 The authority 
for federal government procurement is exercised by the Treasury Board, which is a 
                                                
16
 S.C., 1994, c. 47 [assented to 15 December 1994]  
17
 Source: MARCAN <http://www.marcan.net/index_en/procure.htm> (last accessed May 2006) 
18
 Eg, R Paterson and M Band, International Trade and Investment Law in Canada (Thomson: 
Toronto, 1994) ch “Government Procurement” 
19
 For example Canada has excluded shipbuilding and rail transportation equipment:  Canada GPA 
General Notes note 1. 
20
 Public Works and Government Services Supply Manual, s 5.070. 
21
 Article 24 of the Nunavut Agreement.  Aboriginal preferences also involve Comprehensive Land 
Claims in the far north and assistance with small businesses, see A Van Dyk “Recent Changes in the 
Canadian Government’s Contracting Policy” 7 PPLR CS110 at CS112-113. 
22
 Canada GPA Annex 1. SDRs are the International Monetary Fund’s international reserve unit of 
account and are based upon the currencies of five countries.   
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committee of the Privy Council (Cabinet) and is located in the national capital of 
Ottawa.23 The Canadian International Trade Tribunal (‘CITT’), also located in 
Ottawa, provides judicial oversight to the implementation of the agreement24 fulfilling 
the GPA’s requirement that domestic bid challenge procedures are maintained within 
each country by an impartial tribunal.25  
At the time when the initial GPA negotiations were concluded, Canada 
claimed that it would provide a ‘final list’ of included sub-central entities within a 
period of 18 months, subject to obtaining commitments from provinces.26 In the 
twelve years since the federal government registered this statement under its Annex 2, 
none of Canada’s provinces have made such commitments and remain outside the 
GPA. This has not gone un-noticed by other GPA members, including the Chairman 
of the Committee on Government Procurement, who expressed concern that Canada 
has not honoured its commitments with respect to sub-central coverage.27 As we shall 
see below, Canada later offered an explanation; however it is likely that additional 
unspecified concerns play a part in ongoing provincial abstention. Before we explore 
these reasons we will briefly consider the other signatories to the GPA which have 
listed sub-central governments in order to illustrate the anomalous nature of Canada’s 
empty Annex 2. 
 
III   Sub Central Entities and the WTO GPA 
                                                
23
 For a discussion of the methodology of federal government procurement in Canada see Van Dyk 
above note 20. 
24
 Canadian International Trade Tribunal Act R.S. 1985 c.47 s.30.1 definition of ‘government 
institution’. The CITT is also the designated bid challenge authority for NAFTA and the Agreement on 
Internal Trade with respect to procurement by the federal government. 
25
 GPA Article XX. 
26
 Canada GPA Annex 2, 1 March 2000. 
27
 WTO Document GPA M/5/ 11 April 1997 
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Among the most important of the sub-central entities covered by the GPA are those of 
Japan. Japan’s regions had in the past engaged in the discriminatory practice of 
preferring suppliers that maintained local offices but now all of the nation’s forty-
seven prefectures are covered by the GPA, subject to several exceptions including 
notably the supply and distribution of electricity.28 In order to implement the 
agreement, Japan’s central government amended legislation regarding local autonomy 
and issued formal guidance outlining the procurement objectives. The regions were 
then free to establish their own procedures and rules to implement the procurement 
objectives subject to constraints imposed by the central government.29 Although there 
are no statistics available for Japanese procurement specifically at the sub-central 
level, procurement from foreign sources in 2002 accounted for almost 14 per cent 
(both goods and services) of all Japanese government procurement. Almost ten trillion 
yen were spent in public purchases of goods and services by all level of governments 
in Japan in 2002.30 
 Korea also lists all sub-central administrative government entities in its GPA 
Annex 2, including six municipalities and nine regions31 as does Switzerland, which 
lists all twenty-three cantons.32 Korean sub-central entities maintain exclusions for 
procurements from small businesses, which as we shall see below, is a point of 
contention for Canada.33 Iceland does not list any regional governments but its Annex 
2 states that ‘all contracting local public authorities including municipalities’ are 
                                                
28
 Japan Annex 2 note 6, 1 March 2000  
29
 See JH Grier “Japan’s Implementation of the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement” 17 U 
Pa J of Inter Economic Law (1996) 605 at 629-631. 
30
  “Japan’s Government Procurement: Policy and Achievements Annual Report – Toward Government 
Procurement Open to the World” ch 2 (2003) <http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/procurement/2003> 
(last accessed  May 2006) 
31
  Korea GPA Annex 2, 1 March 2000 
32
 Switzerland GPA Annex 2, 7 February 2003.   
33
 Korea GPA Annex 2 note 3 
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included34 and a similar approach is taken by Liechtenstein which simply lists ‘public 
authorities at local level.’35Israel’s Annex 2 specifies municipal entities only.36 
Norway lists all of its 19 counties (without naming them) and 435 municipalities.37 
Annex 2 does not apply to Singapore, Hong Kong China and the Netherlands with 
respect to Aruba because those states to not have sub-central agencies. 38 The 
European Community’s (‘EC’) Annex 2 under the GPA covers all existing regional 
and local governments without specifying them by name.39 Under its extensive 
General Notes to the GPA, the EC imposes numerous derogations directed at specific 
members in relation to particular industries. For example, the EC extends no sub-
central coverage to Canada whatsoever and none to the US with respect to the 
procurement of goods.40 There are no statistics available for the quantity of EC 
foreign procurement at the sub-central level.  The EC’s Annex 2, like those of most 
members, commits goods and services above a threshold value of 200,000 SDR.41 
The United States originally allowed only limited state-level coverage when 
the GPA agreement was originally concluded in December 1993 because it was 
unwilling to provide coverage at the state level without agreement from those entities 
themselves. According to Reich, the United States claimed that domestic political 
difficulties in binding state governments were responsible for failure to negotiate 
more comprehensive state coverage. While the US federal government has the 
authority to compel state governments to accede to international trade agreements 
Washington it not always willing to do so: ‘…politicians are reluctant to use their 
                                                
34
 Iceland GPA Annex 2, 28 April 2001 
35
 Liechtenstein Annex 2, 1 March 2000 
36
 Specifying Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa. Israel GPA Annex 2, 13 February 2006 
37
 Norway GPA Annex 2, 1 March 2000 
38
 Singapore GPA Annex 2, 1 March 2000; Hong Kong GPA Annex 2, 9 March 2005; Netherlands 
GPA Annex 2, 1 March 2000 
39
 EC GPA Annex 2, 1 March 2000 
40
 EC GPA General Notes, note 1. 
41
 EC GPA Annex 2. 
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powers in particular in the area of procurement. They feel that it may be perceived as 
a federal intrusion not only on state jurisdiction but also on how the states spend their 
own revenues.’42 The federal government was relegated to suggesting a voluntary 
compliance plan which would attempt to obtain the broadest possible coverage of sub-
central agencies.43 Thus voluntary accession to government procurement agreements 
was viewed as a ‘convenient solution which shifts the political decision-making to the 
state level.’44 Procurement policies at the state level have been used as tools of 
censure towards foreign states, as seen most notably in Massachusetts’ exclusion of 
procurement by Burmese firms because of that country’s human rights record.45 The 
United States sub-central coverage has expanded significantly after efforts of the 
federal government to encourage states to enter into the bi-lateral agreement with the 
European Union based on the guiding principle of reciprocity that was required under 
the GPA Article XXIV.7. As it stands, the existing sub-central coverage of states 
within the United States is not complete. Thirty seven states are partially covered, 
including those whose markets had been the most closed, but some states have no 
government procurement regulation whatsoever. Threshold values for sub-central 
procurement are set at 355,000 SDR for supplies and services, which tied with 
Canada’s vacuous Annex 2, are higher than those of any other member.46 
Approximately $US 94 billion is spent in procurement of goods and $US 40 billion in 
services at the state (and local) level per year. Most US states retain ‘Buy American’ 
provisions in their procurement regulations, as required under the federal Buy 
                                                
42
 Reich note 1 at 294.  See also K Cooper “To Compel or Encourage:  Seeking Compliance With 
International Trade Agreements at the State Level” (1993) 2 Minnesota J of Global Trade 143 at 166 
43
 Reich ibid at 294. 
44
 Reich ibid 264. 
45
 Massachusetts “Act Regulating State Contracts with Companies Doing Business in or with Burma” 
of June 25, 1996 ch 130 s1, 1996 Mass Acts 210.  
46
 US GPA Annex 2, 16 October 2002; Canada GPA Annex 2. 
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American Act47 but these only apply to procurements that fall outside the scope of the 
GPA.48 The United States Annex 2 retains an exemption for distressed areas and 
minority owned businesses and Annex 1 contains small businesses set-asides which 
also apply to sub-central procurement. This latter exemption has been instrumental in 
Canada’s sub-central omissions. 
 
 
IV   Sub-Central Government Procurement in Canada 
Canada consists of ten provinces and three territories, four of which have populations 
above three million: Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia and Alberta.49 It is within the 
provinces’ constitutional purview to accept or reject all international agreements 
entered into by the central government and as such the Canadian federal government 
cannot compel its provincial counterparts to accede to any of Canada’s WTO 
obligations. Although the federal executive government has the exclusive jurisdiction 
to negotiate and accede to treaties under section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867, the 
ability to implement international agreements into domestic law can (and frequently 
does) fall within the jurisdiction of the provinces as listed in section 92 of the 
Constitution Act. A treaty that requires the expenditure of public monies or purports 
to change existing law (such as an agreement modifying government procurement 
policy) is not directly applicable under Canadian law unless there is an act specifically 
incorporating it into domestic law.50 Consequently an Act passed by the federal 
parliament would be inapplicable in relation to provincial procurement decisions 
because provincial jurisdiction encompasses ‘local works and undertakings’, 
                                                
47
 41 U.S.C. 10a-10d 
48
 WTO Trade Policy Review – United States WT/TPR/S/56 at [288] 1 June 1999 
49
 2005 figures, source: Statistics Canada <www.statscan.ca> (last accessed May 2006)  
50
 Francis v The Queen [1956] SCR 618 at 625. 
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‘property …within the province’ and ‘all matters of a merely local or private 
nature.’51 Procurement activities, either relating to goods or services, clearly fall under 
one or more of these fairly broad provincial powers. Steger observed shortly after 
Canada implemented the WTO treaty into domestic law that additional WTO 
commitments might well encroach upon matters that fall within the provincial domain 
and this would require cooperation with the nation’s sub-central governments52, a 
situation that was probably responsible for Canada’s recent abandonment of the 
Kyoto Protocol on climate change. It should also be recognized that as treaty making 
is an exclusively federal power, international law does not recognize any international 
arrangements between provinces and foreign states. Thus any sub-central commitment 
to the WTO GPA would be extended to the WTO by Canada on behalf of its 
provinces, not through the provinces directly – which are themselves not WTO 
members.   
Statistics for provincial government procurement expenditures are incomplete 
in part because the largest province (by population), Ontario, has failed to report its 
total procurement expenditures since 1996. Individual expenditures of the reporting 
provinces are considerably less than that of the federal government, but when taken in 
aggregate, even lacking Ontario’s contribution, almost half of all government 
procurement in Canada is done at the sub-central level: $CDN 6 billion in 2003-04.53 
That same year provincial procurement expenditures for the three other largest 
provinces were: Quebec $1.9 billion; British Columbia $1.1 billion; and Alberta $2.2 
billion.54 Although Canadian provincial governments clearly represent sizable 
                                                
51
 Constitution Act, 1867, s. 92 
52
 D Steger “Canadian Implementation of the WTO Agreement” in Implementing the Uruguay Round J 
Jackson and A Sykes eds. (Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1997).  
53
 Source: MARCAN < http://www.marcan.net/index_en/procure.htm> (last accessed May 2006). This 
figure may be misleading because provincial statistics include procurement by municipal governments. 
54
 Ibid.  Note again that these figures include municipal government spending. 
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markets for international firms, no publicly accessible records of the location of the 
supplying firms is kept by any province and the extent of provincial procurement 
from international suppliers is unknown. As stated at the beginning of this article, not 
only have there been no GPA commitments from Canadian provinces, leaving 
Canada’s existing Annex 2 to the agreement unchanged since it was submitted over 
10 years ago, there is no indication that any negotiations have ever taken place 
between the Canadian federal government and the individual provinces concerning 
sub-central commitment to the WTO GPA.  If discussions have taken place it has 
been done informally and without publicly accessible record.  
Sub-central government procurement in Canada is currently regulated by 
chapter five of the Agreement on Internal Trade (‘AIT’) which establishes principles 
of non-discrimination and transparency similar to those of the WTO GPA.55 The AIT 
agreement covers trade in goods and services between the Canadian provinces, the 
purpose of which is to achieve efficiency and a strong economy.56 The agreement was 
ratified by all 10 provinces, the federal government, and the two territories57 in 1995 
and encompasses procurements in excess of $25,000 for goods and $100,000 for 
services.58 Of the provinces which conduct significant procurement activities, only 
Quebec has formally enacted the AIT into its provincial legislation,59 although all 
parties are expected to maintain procurement practices that conform to its 
requirements and decisions of any provincial government are subject to challenge by 
the CITT under the agreements dispute settlement system.60 The AIT’s principles of 
fairness and transparency in the tendering process and in bid valuation, which recall 
                                                
55
 Art 504(2) 
56
 Art 501 
57
 The third territory, Nunavut, did not exist when the agreement was signed. 
58
 Art 502 
59
 An Act Respecting the Implementation of the Agreement on Internal Trade RSQ c. M-35.1.1 
60
 See further L DiMarzo “Dispute Resolution Provisions of the Agreement on Internal Trade” 34 
Alberta L R 240 (1995). 
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those of the GPA, are outlined in Articles 505 and 506. Like the GPA, there are 
narrow exclusions for unforeseeable urgency and national security.61 While the 
agreement ensures non-discrimination among Canadian provinces, Article 504(5) of 
the AIT permits a party to accord a price preference of no more than 10 per cent for 
Canadian content of purchased goods, provided that potential suppliers are informed 
of this policy in tender documents. The government of Ontario repealed its Canadian 
content policy for all procurements in 2001 but still maintains a 10 per cent price 
preference for Canadian structural steel products on construction contracts above 
CDN $100,000,62 a policy that was likely intended to assist the mining and smelting 
industry in the province – Canada’s leading producer of steel. Other than this 
preference in Ontario which may be levied even against a supplier from another 
province, the occurrence of procurement discrimination against foreign firms by 
individual provinces is unknown, although the EC noted in 1999 that British 
Columbia and Quebec accorded national price preferencing of up to 10 per cent.63 
Under current law, discriminatory pricing against a non-Canadian firm would not be 
illegal as the AIT deals only with suppliers located within Canada.64 Accordingly the 
lack of transparency with respect to the provinces’ treatment of foreign bids leaves 
international suppliers in the difficult position of not knowing whether it is worth their 
effort to prepare a bid if domestic firms may garner favourable consideration. The 
AIT dispute resolution service is also only available to Canadian firms and thus there 
                                                
61
 For further discussion of the AIT see A Van Dyk “The Canadian Agreement on Internal Trade” 7 
PPLR CS176 (1998) 
62
 This is called the Canadian Steel Preference Policy and allows a 10 per cent deduction of the value of 
bids that use Canadian structural steel products. “Tips on How to Do Business with the Ontario 
Government” Ontario Ministry of Government Services  (7 Feb 2006) 
<http://www.ppitpb.gov.on.ca/mbs/psb/psb.nsf/english/tips.html#intro>  (last accessed May 2006) 
63
 “Review of National Implementing Legislation – Canada, World Trade Organization” GPA/51 18 
June 2001. Comment by the EC. 
64
 The various provincial governments’ contract submission guidelines are available on-line through the 
respective provincial government websites but do not generally divulge any Canadian price 
preferencing in terms of selection criteria. Provincial procurement representatives do not respond to 
direct queries from the public regarding Canadian price preferences.  
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is no means of domestic redress for any discrimination by a provincial government 
against an international supplier.65 A key point here is that the provinces are already 
required to engage in non-discriminatory, transparent procurement practices with 
respect to Canadian firms under the AIT such that the principles of the GPA could 
scarcely be viewed as revolutionary from a legal standpoint – but for the prohibition 
that it would impose against discrimination towards foreign firms, which may or may 
not currently engage in supply contracts with Canadian provincial governments. At 
first glance, then, provincial abstention from the GPA may seem perplexing. We will 




V   Explanations for Canada’s Sub-Central Abstention from the WTO GPA 
In October 1995 the WTO’s Committee for Government Procurement questioned 
Canada as to its failure to commit sub-central entities and the Canadian delegation 
responded:  
 
 Canada is prepared to table an offer at the sub-central level if, and only 
if, members are prepared:  (1) to include sectors of priority to 
Canadian suppliers, for example, in the steel and transportation areas;  
and (2) to agree to circumscribe the use of small business and other set 
asides in a manner that, while not precluding their use, would provide 
an acceptable security of access to suppliers from all members of this 
committee.66 
 
                                                
65
 An aggrieved supplier could also launch a private action against the relevant government agency, 
possibly for breach of warranty or implied term that the contract would be awarded to the lowest 
bidder. For example of such a claim see the House of Lords decision Harvela Investments Ltd. v Royal 
Trust Company of Canada (CI) Ltd [1986] AC 207.  See also S Arrowsmith “Protecting the Interests of 
Bidders for Public Contracts: The Role of the Common Law” [1994] CLJ 104.   
66
 Review of National Implementing Legislation – Canada, above note 62. 
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Thus Canada initially used its Annex 2 omissions as a bargaining chip to encourage 
the commitment of sectors from other members in which Canada holds a comparative 
advantage, namely steel and automobiles. This strategy seems to have been aimed 
primarily at the United States where several sub-central entities, including populous 
New York, Michigan and Illinois, exclude procurement of structural grade steel and 
motor vehicles from GPA coverage.67 However, while such derogations clearly 
restrict market opportunities for important Canadian industries, there is no reason that 
Canada could not establish corresponding Annex 2 exclusions for goods in which the 
US enjoys a comparative advantage over Canada such as textiles or computer 
technology. Assistance to regional suppliers of these goods might help compensate for 
lost opportunities in the US for Canadian steel and automotive firms while opening up 
markets for all other goods and services in other sub-central member entities. The 
flexible nature of the GPA Article V allows members to establish their own list of 
derogations for certain industries – or for social purposes where economic gain may 
be of secondary importance, such as the aforementioned preferences for aboriginal 
businesses. States are free to impose derogations may be imposed with respect to 
certain members and not others, as the EC has done.68 Signatory status under the GPA 
does not restrict sub-central governments from such promotion of domestic suppliers, 
provided that it is done in an open manner.69 Indeed, Canada expressly allowed for 
such policy-oriented procurement at the provincial level in the text of its Annex 2.70 It 
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should be noted that none of the other large GPA members maintains sub-central 
restrictions on automobiles or steel and while the Japanese government procures most 
of its steel domestically, it, like sub central governments in the US and the EC, 
procures significant quantities of forest products, minerals and machinery from 
foreign sources71, and that goods of this kind account for a large portion of Canada’s 
exports72  China’s sub-central governments may ultimately choose to open the market 
for steel and transportation products upon eventual accession to the GPA, which could 
further represent an enormous market to Canadian steel and automotive suppliers. The 
discriminatory nature of the US small business set asides73 (which are also exercised 
by Korea)74 are a legitimate problem for smaller Canadian suppliers and are rightly a 
cause of concern to trade negotiators, but Canadian provinces could counter the 
negative effects of this exemption through their own exclusions for small businesses, 
which were listed after Canada’s above comments to the Government Procurement 
Committee were issued.75 Small business restrictions in Canada should assist in the 
protection of the most vulnerable firms against cheaper foreign suppliers. Although 
these reciprocal measures may not offer perfect solutions, and could amount to 
substantial derogations from the GPA’s aims76, they would afford Canadian firms 
with some measure of compensation for lost contracts abroad. Canada exports far 
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more of its goods to the US than any other nation77 and US sector restrictions will 
remain a burden to certain Canadian firms, but they should not prevent all Canadian 
firms from enjoying access to a wide range of other sub-central markets for goods and 
services worldwide. Clearly Canada’s strategy of withholding provincial GPA 
commitment to compel the removal of certain restrictions by other members has not 
worked. Some open competition in sub-central government procurement is preferable 
to none and Canada’s obstinacy in this matter is quite simply a case of cutting off its 
nose to spite its face.   
  In addition to Canada’s stated reasons for lack of sub-central coverage at the 
GPA, there are several less obvious factors which may be in operation, which 
probably stem from the provinces themselves rather than from a national economic 
strategy. First, one possible disadvantage of accession to the GPA is the cost 
associated with membership. Several commentators have observed that practical 
difficulties involved with the bi-lateral negotiation procedure could operate as a 
barrier to joining, particularly given the complexity of some of the GPA rules78 and 
the paucity of technical expertise in government procurement.79 While this may be 
true of sub-central governments within developing states, it is not a concern that is 
applicable to even the smallest Canadian provinces which possess the infrastructure 
necessary to conduct complex negotiations – particularly since assistance from the 
federal government as the negotiating WTO member involved could be available. 
Moreover, as we have seen, the provinces’ procurement regulations under the AIT are 
not unlike those required by the GPA such that additional administration might be 
minimal. The burden of establishing the required review mechanism for procurement 
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disputes has been cited as one of the chief barriers to GPA membership80. However, 
this function could be performed with respect to sub-central entities in Canada simply 
by modifying the jurisdiction of the CITT to cover provincial procurement decisions. 
 There may be strategic disadvantages in accession to the GPA for Canadian 
provinces. Cooper has noted that sub-central governments in the United States have 
little incentive to commit to the agreement individually because benefits derived from 
the GPA are likely to accrue on a nationwide basis rather than directly to a 
participating state. According to Cooper’s theory, if American State X signs on it is 
unlikely that Nation Y will enter into increased procurement contracts with State X 
firms because it is administratively impractical for Nation Y procurement authorities 
to try to distinguish between particular firms from different American states. Such 
authorities would need to demand labels of origin for products and there would be 
confusion regarding firms that are based on more than one state. Rather Nation Y’s 
government would probably open up a particular sub-central procurement market in 
Nation Y (such as Province Y1) to all American firms. Thus the reciprocal benefits 
for State X for opening its procurement market to Nation Y would be minimal.81 This 
is why, as Reich points out, mandatory coverage of all sub-central entities would 
realize the full reciprocal benefits of all states as a whole.82 However, as we have 
seen, forced coverage of sub-central governments is constitutionally impossible in 
Canada, irrespective of the wishes of other GPA members, such that Canada and its 
federal markets might find itself completely excluded from the agreement. The flaw 
in Cooper’s reasoning is that foreign sub-central governments may find it easier to 
discern location of suppliers than he realizes, not necessarily through labels on 
packages as they might in smaller contracts for goods, but via corporate information – 
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which is readily available for examination by tendering governments in the case of 
large bids. Firms from Canada will either be incorporated in a particular province, or 
if incorporated federally, all firms must register the province in which the head office 
is situated.83 Fearing association with a province that has not signed the GPA, 
Canadian firms will be motivated to relocate to a province that has committed to the 
WTO regime, a clear benefit to a listing province. 
 A compelling explanation for the provinces’ failure to sign on to the GPA may 
be the strong sense of regionalism that pervades Canada. WTO analysts are familiar 
with the threat that multilateral trade poses to national sovereignty84 but sovereignty 
also plays a role at the sub-national level. Many provinces resent regulatory intrusion 
by the federal government and consequently, like many sub-central entities 
throughout the world, the provinces wish to retain the ability to exercise 
discriminatory purchasing as a way of asserting autonomy in the face of an 
international agreement negotiated by the federal government, which may be viewed 
as oppressive regulation at the central level. There is a significant history of regional 
tension within Canada, most notably concerning the largely francophone province of 
Quebec. More recently regionalism has evolved into ‘western alienation’ of the 
provinces west of Ontario which claim that they are largely excluded from decision-
making at the federal level.85 The idea that these provinces had been coerced into an 
international obligation by Ottawa primarily for the benefit of firms elsewhere in 
Canada might not sit well with the constituents of the elected politicians who would 
be negotiating GPA coverage. However, the provinces’ desire to fulfil their own 
economic and social policies by favouring local suppliers of goods and services has 
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already been restricted by the Agreement on Internal Trade, which ensures that there 
will be no discriminatory trade between provinces. This suggests that the support of 
regional firms at the expense of other Canadian firms is not the primary motivation 
for abstaining from the GPA and regionalism at least in the economic sense is not a 
priority for the provinces. Moreover, anything that fosters provincial government 
engagement in activity at an international level should be welcomed as a kind of 
regional empowerment. 
Finally, it is possible that the failure of Canada’s provinces to join the GPA 
may be rooted in a more fundamental aversion to ‘outsourcing’ by governments, 
irrespective of the location of the supplying firm. A study recently conducted in 
Europe revealed entrenched opposition within government departments to the use of 
private sector firms to deliver public services in effort to achieve value-for-money.86 
According to the study, the emphasis on government procurement is a key component 
of this surge of privatization seen notably in Japan and France, which is aimed at 
countering the ‘bureaucratic inertia’ that characterized public administration for 
decades. Managers within the public service are the most intransigent, and 
undoubtedly motivated by the concern for job security; they contend that commercial 
oriented management of traditionally ‘public’ services has led to a diminished quality 
such that the public good has suffered.87 While a discussion of the merits of 
privatization is beyond the scope of this article, it is evident that governments’ 
attempts to streamline services via outsourcing to firms remains controversial and 
with the possible exceptions of Alberta88 and at one point Ontario89, Canadian 
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provinces have, at least in the past, been resistant to the trend of privatization that has 
taken in hold in jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and the United States. Thus 
in expressing disinterest in transparent, non-discriminatory procurement at the 
international level, Canadian provinces are not so much protecting regional firms as 
they are protecting regional governments, primarily in relation to the provision of 
services. Provincial governments are in effect taking care of themselves by keeping 
cheaper, private suppliers from around the world off the bargaining table. Regional 
governments justify their opposition to outsourcing by pointing to high price 
Canadian bids that are not forced to compete internationally. This represents hostility 
to the private sector generally – not to foreign firms. 
 
VI   Benefits from Canadian Sub-Central Commitment to the WTO GPA 
There are several reasons why the provinces should accede to the GPA, some of 
which have been noted already. The first clear benefit is improved access for 
Canadian firms to foreign sub-central markets. Whilst this may admittedly be limited 
with respect to key industries such as steel and transportation because of other 
members’ derogations, Canada’s exports of lumber, oil and natural gas could have 
significant sub-central demand abroad. Canadian firms are already at a disadvantage 
currently because of the high value of the Canadian dollar which renders any goods it 
exports expensive to foreign consumers and enhanced market access is vital to their 
survival both domestically and globally. Arrowsmith observes that GPA gaps in 
coverage at the sub-central level have resulted in derogations from the MFN principle 
by those countries with more comprehensive coverage. For example, Canada’s failure 
to commit sub-central entities resulted in Japan and the European Community 
denying GPA benefits to suppliers from Canada in relation to all of their (Japan and 
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the EC’s) Annex 2 entities.90 Potentially lucrative sub-central markets in other nations 
will thus remain unavailable to Canadian firms should the provinces remain excluded 
from the GPA.  Regional procurement activities are economically significant, 
especially in highly decentralized countries such as Japan. When the GPA was signed 
by Japan in the mid 1990s, 80 per cent of public works in that country were 
undertaken at the regional level of government.91 This should be of particular interest 
to firms operating in Canada’s west. 
 The second obvious advantage to GPA coverage for Canadian provincial 
governments is that accepting tenders by foreign firms without price discrimination 
will lead to improved competition which will in turn foster more value-oriented 
procurement practices in the face of internal inefficiencies such as political pressures. 
Canadian firms will be forced to compete with international suppliers for government 
contracts and this will result in better, cheaper contracts and therefore more satisfied 
taxpayers. This should be especially relevant to Canada where government corruption 
in connection with the Federal government’s recent advertising sponsorship activities 
in Quebec is still in the minds of many Canadians.92 The downside to obtaining value-
for-money is that what the economy saves in reduced government expenditure, the 
economy may lose as money flows out of the provinces and into the hands of foreign 
firms. However, provincial firms may still end up winning the contracts, having been 
forced into offering lower cost services by the threat of foreign competition.  
 Another related reason that the provinces should embrace the GPA is the 
market opportunities that this would present to foreign firms that have significant 
Canadian ownership. Transnational corporations with Canadian foreign direct 
investment would be able to tender for contracts to Canadian provincial governments 
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earning revenue that would ultimately fall into the hands of Canadian shareholders. 
Thus Canadian investors would be able to conduct business with their own regional 
governments through a foreign firm. Of course, such gains could be achieved outside 
the GPA framework by sub-central procuring bodies granting favourable treatment to 
foreign firms with a certain percentage of Canadian ownership. One additional 
substantive benefit from GPA membership noted by Dischendorfer is that it would 
‘enable a government to influence the development of international arrangements on 
government procurement,’93 although admittedly this is less meaningful for sub-
central entities because the internationally negotiating body would remain their 
federal counterpart. 
 Lastly, given that Canada’s primary trade relationship is a bi-lateral one with 
the United States and Canada’s international trade in procurement may not yet be 
extensive, the provinces should still be accede to the GPA because it represents a 
gesture of international good faith to the WTO trading forum. Arrowsmith urges that 
‘expanding participation in government procurement disciplines is important for 
achieving the long-term goals of the WTO, especially as the WTO embraces more 
countries with an extensive state sector.’94 Although the GPA is an optional 
agreement it represents a key component of the WTO’s overall purpose of promoting 
international free trade, much of which is conducted by public bodies. Furthermore, 
the extent of an applicant’s coverage is currently specified as a criterion for GPA 
membership.95 As commitments on government procurement on both federal and sub-
central levels were included as part of China’s WTO membership negotiations, 
similar government procurement coverage may be expected for future applicants to 
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the WTO itself.96 Canada may consequently face diplomatic pressure from within the 
WTO in the future if it does not commit its provinces and this could be harmful to the 
nation’s trading interests as well as damaging to Canada’s image in international 
affairs. 
 
VII  Conclusion 
That Canada failed to list its provincial governments in its commitment to the WTO 
GPA is in one sense surprising given Canada’s reputation as a globally-conscious 
state. Yet the omission of the provinces is less remarkable when one considers the 
strong regional mentality present within the country – provinces wish to assert their 
own economic and social policies through a tool such as government procurement that 
favours local suppliers rather than bend to a policy of free trade dictated by the 
capital. This cannot be challenged domestically as the provinces are within their 
constitutional authority to decide to which international obligations they commit 
themselves. Equally disturbing is that while the provinces have agreed not to favour 
local suppliers over those from other Canadian provinces through provisions of the 
AIT that echo the principles of the GPA, it remains unclear if foreign firms suffer any 
general price discrimination either mandatory or discretionary.  
 This article has attempted to illustrate that Canada’s failure to commit its 
provinces to the GPA represents both a significant shortcoming in the interests of 
global government commerce and an impediment to regional economic prosperity. It 
has been argued that accession to the GPA is vital to Canadian provinces because of 
the crucial benefit of enhanced internal competition and foreign market access, 
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despite Canada’s complaint that its some of its key industries were largely excluded 
from other members’ coverage. Without universal sub-central membership in the 
GPA, valuable regional procurement contracts around the world will remain closed to 
Canadian firms, regardless of the listing of Canada’s central government. Sub-central 
projects of other nations, such as those of Japan and eventually China may become as 
lucrative as those of their central governments and the importance of access to these 
markets for Canadian companies cannot be overstated. We must also keep in mind 
that as the global market for government purchasing expands, WTO GPA members 
will inevitably become aware that Canada is not one entity but a mosaic of (largely) 
economically independent regions. As such, foreign regional governments may 
discern more readily between tendering firms from a particular province via 
jurisdiction of incorporation and any province which has joined the GPA will enjoy a 
corresponding advantage as against its Canadian neighbours. It is ironic that in the 
current climate of economic globalization, the growing importance of Alberta’s 
oilfields and the ascendancy of Toronto as the second largest financial centre of the 
Americas may draw the world’s gaze to Canada’s regions. Each province must 
capitalize on this trend by committing to the WTO GPA or else the provinces will 
suffer the unfortunate consequences of global isolationism in the field of government 
commerce. 
